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ABSTRACT
I argue for a conception of health as a person’s ability to achieve or exercise
a cluster of basic human activities. These basic activities are in turn speci-
fied through free-standing ethical reasoning about what constitutes a
minimal conception of a human life with equal human dignity in the modern
world. I arrive at this conception of health by closely following and modifying
Lennart Nordenfelt’s theory of health which presents health as the ability to
achieve vital goals. Despite its strengths I transform Nordenfelt’s argument
in order to overcome three significant drawbacks. Nordenfelt makes vital
goals relative to each community or context and significantly reflective of
personal preferences. By doing so, Nordenfelt’s conception of health faces
problems with both socially relative concepts of health and subjectively
defined wellbeing. Moreover, Nordenfelt does not ever explicitly specify a
set of vital goals. The theory of health advanced here replaces Nordenfelt’s
(seemingly) empty set of preferences and society-relative vital goals with
a human species-wide conception of basic vital goals, or ‘central human
capabilities and functionings’. These central human capabilities come out
of the capabilities approach (CA) now familiar in political philosophy and
economics, and particularly reflect the work of Martha Nussbaum. As a
result, the health of an individual should be understood as the ability to
achieve a basic cluster of beings and doings—or having the overarching
capability, a meta-capability, to achieve a set of central or vital inter-related
capabilities and functionings.
INTRODUCTION
Health and disease as well as related concepts such
as illness, disability, impairment, and so forth have
profound importance in modern societies. A range of
rights and obligations often of great material and life-
or-death significance flow from how these concepts are
defined. Even at the supra-societal level, the concepts of
health and disease are frequently used in evaluating the
state of societies or to motivate global action. More-
over, it would seem prudent given the exponential rise
in health development assistance as well as explosion
in academic research programs on global health since
the start of the new millennium to ensure or reaffirm
that we have conceptual clarity on the concept of
health.
The uncomfortable truth, of course, is that behind the
billions of dollars of health development assistance, the
multi-trillion dollar global healthcare industry, far reach-
ing reorganization plans to improve public health, or
public agitation for greater action on health inequalities
and global health, we do not have a shared or coherent
conception of health. If this assertion seems polemical and
far-fetched, ask more than one individual whose work
directly involves health if they could provide a definition
of health. It will become clear quite quickly that the
concept of health is used without much scrutiny. As Alan
Cribb rightly describes it, health often seems to be ‘merely
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a useful compound label’ for a variety of things.1 So what
then are we doing when we talk about health, healthcare,
global health, or health equity and health justice?
The background or tacit understanding in the medical
professions is that a person is healthy if they have no
disease. And such a notion of disease is quite broad
in that it encompasses infectious disease, chronic disease,
injuries, poisonings, growth disorders, functional im-
pairments and so on; disease encompasses all the condi-
tions that are seen to be deviation from a ‘normal’ or
‘natural’ life course or physiological functioning of
a human being. In public health, the aim is often to
‘contain and control’ diseases in populations that lead to
impairments and mortality. In pursuing disease control,
such policies are seen to be improving or protecting
the public’s health. And in health economics, the aim
of economic evaluation or ‘cost-utility’ analysis of pro-
grammes is implicitly to maximize health. Health, in
turn, is often defined by a mathematical function involv-
ing time, preferences (‘utility weights’), and levels of
impairments from a disease condition. So the concept of
disease plays a crucial role in our conception of health
in a variety of important domains. At the least, disease
means that health is not present, and health means that
disease is not present. Improving health means control-
ling disease, and controlling disease means improving
health. Nevertheless, the concept of health for many
people does not only relate to the presence or absence of
disease. It has to do with how they feel and what they
are able to do. And even in the medical professions,
given that some chronic diseases can be managed for
decades, it seems inadequate to indefinitely categorize
or label a person as unhealthy despite her successful
management of a chronic disease.
The following discussion seeks to break the mutuality
between disease and health. The theory of health I am
advancing is not centrally moored to the concept of
disease, and rejects the plausibility and pursuit of a value-
free and scientific notion of health. Instead, I argue for a
conception of health as a person’s ability to achieve or
exercise a cluster of basic human activities or capabilities.
These basic activities are in turn specified through
free-standing ethical reasoning about what constitutes a
minimal conception of a human life with equal human
dignity in the modern world. I arrive at this conception by
closely following and modifying Lennart Nordenfelt’s
theory of health which presents health as the ability to
achieve vital goals.2 Despite its strengths I transform
Nordenfelt’s argument in order to overcome what I con-
sider to be three significant drawbacks. Nordenfelt makes
vital goals relative to each community or context and
significantly reflective of individual preferences. By doing
so, Nordenfelt’s conception of health faces problems with
both socially relative concepts of health and subjectively
defined wellbeing. Moreover, Nordenfelt does not ever
explicitly specify a set of vital goals. The theory of health
advanced here replaces Nordenfelt’s (seemingly) empty
set of preferences and society-relative vital goals with a
human species-wide conception of basic vital goals, or
‘central human capabilities and functionings’. These
central human capabilities come out of the capabilities
approach (CA) now familiar in political philosophy and
economics, and particularly reflect the work of Martha
Nussbaum.3 As a result, the health of an individual
should be understood as the ability to achieve a basic
cluster of beings and doings – or having the overarching
capability, a meta-capability, to achieve a set of basic
inter-related capabilities and functionings.
The article proceeds as follows. The first section pre-
sents and reviews Nordenfelt’s theory. And though I am
enthusiastic about Nordenfelt’s reasoning, I identify
three weaknesses. I focus on the vagueness about vital
goals, the standard circumstances clause, and the role of
subjective preferences. Following that, I present my argu-
ment for conceiving health as the capability to achieve a
basic set of capabilities and functionings. I then discuss
some practical consequences and conclude the article.
NORDENFELT’S THEORY OF HEALTH
Lennart Nordenfelt, a Swedish philosopher, has devel-
oped a theory of health partly as result of immense dis-
satisfaction with the prevailing view of health as the
absence of disease and varied attempts to present it as a
coherent theoretical concept. The most famous attempt
to theorize health as the absence of disease was of course
by Christopher Boorse.4 Boorse’s theory of disease and
health has profoundly shaped the parameters of the
debates in the philosophy of health and medicine since
the 1970s. The idea of disease as abnormal functioning
and health as being a range of species typical functioning
1 A. Cribb. 2005.Health and the good society: setting healthcare ethics in
social context. Oxford: Clarendon Press: 22.
2 L. Nordenfelt. 1995. On the nature of health: an action-theoretic
approach. 2nd revised & enlarged edn. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic; L.
Nordenfelt. 1987. On the nature of health: an action-theoretic approach.
Dordrecht: D. Reidel; L. Nordenfelt et al. 2001. Health, Science, and
Ordinary Language. Amsterdam: Rodopi; L. Nordenfelt. 2000. Action,
ability and health: essays in the philosophy of action and welfare.
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
3 A. Sen. 2009. The Idea of Justice. London: Allen Lane: 468; M.C.
Nussbaum. 2006. Frontiers of justice: disability, nationality, species
membership. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard Univer-
sity Press.
4 C. Boorse. On The Distinction Between Disease And Illness. Philos
Public Affa 1975; 5: 49–68; C. Boorse. Origins Of Indeterminacy Thesis.
J Philos 1975; 72: 369–387; C. Boorse. What A Theory Of Mental
Health Should Be. J Theory Soc Behav 1976; 6: 61–84; C. Boorse.
Wright On Functions. Philos Rev 1976; 85: 70–86; C. Boorse. Health As
A Theoretical Concept. Philos Sci 1977; 44: 542–573.
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and involving a threshold (i.e. health is above the lower
tail of normal distribution) has also influenced political
philosophy.5 Despite its enormous influence and de facto
status as the background theory of health and medicine,
from its initial publication to the present it has provoked
numerous and wide-ranging criticisms. Interestingly,
in 1997 Boorse published his one and only rebuttal
which sought to address over two decades of scrutiny.6
Nordenfelt published a counter-rebuttal in order to show
that defects still remain in Boorse’s theory despite the
slight modifications.7 Though Nordenfelt may be less well
known than Boorse, their respective theories have been
identified, quite rightly I believe, as the two most impor-
tant theories in the philosophy of health and medicine
debates.8
Despite his thoroughgoing criticism of Boorse’s
theory, Nordenfelt sees his project as being very similar to
Boorse’s project. Nordenfelt also seeks to reconfigure
or reconstruct and bring coherence to already existing
health related concepts within healthcare as well as in
everyday language. Nordenfelt’s analysis starts with the
commonplace idea that we think of health when it is not
there; when there is instead, pain and disability. He then
chooses disability as the primary concept rather than
pain in proceeding to construct the definition of health
because of the following reason. Even though pain can be
due to disability, and pain can cause one to become dis-
abled, all causes of pain are not necessarily due to dis-
ability. For example, heartache can cause pain, but it
would be misguided to say that feeling pain from heart-
ache is disabling and therefore, not healthy. The scope of
pain exceeds disability, and does not always imply poor
health. So grounding health or ill health in the concept
of pain would lead us in the wrong direction. Focusing
instead on disability, Nordenfelt then makes a linguistic
move. He writes, ‘Disability is a negative notion pre-
supposing the semantic content of its positive contrary,
ability. This gives the analysis of ability a primary place in
my theory of health’.9 He flips the focus from disability,
which relates to the lack of health or being in ‘non-health’
onto the positive notion of ability, or where there is the
presence of health. And then he asks, so what abilities
should a healthy person have; what should a healthy
person be able to do? In pursuing an answer Nordenfelt
envisages human ability consisting of three parts: a
human agent, their intended goal of action, and a sup-
portive environment all of which come together to create
the ‘real practical possibility of action’.10 This concept of
practical possibility of action is informed further by the
philosophy of action-theory, a disciplinary field which
assesses ideas such as human action, causality, intent,
basic action, and action-chains.11
In reflecting on what abilities a healthy person should
have – what they are able to be and do – Nordenfelt
focuses on the end goals of such abilities or actions; he
calls these ‘vital goals’.12 In order to specify these goals,
he considers and then rejects both ‘basic needs’ and sat-
isfying desires. Basic needs are rejected because they are
instrumental to other goals, or they presuppose a concept
of health; some basic needs are derived from a concept of
health. Desire satisfaction is also rejected because of
harmful desires or low desires. Instead, he reasons that a
vital goal of a person is ‘a state of affairs that is such that
it is a necessary condition for the person’s minimal hap-
piness in the long run.’13 The stipulation of ‘in the long
run’ is to avoid health being centred on immediate
pleasure and instead, be more in line with long term
happiness, thriving, or flourishing such as Aristotle’s
eudomonia. More recently, he rephrases the definition of
vital goals as ‘a state of affairs which is either a compo-
nent of or otherwise necessary for the person’s living a
minimally decent life. This includes more than survival’.14
Nevertheless, he does not fully discard satisfying desires
or preferences. He reckons that a person’s desires will still
have a role to play even in Aristotelian happiness or
flourishing. So what Nordenfelt tries to do is distinguish
general desires or wants from the wants linked to life’s
most important or core goals. I shall return to this point
about personal desires again further below.
In formal terms, Nordenfelt’s theory of health is as
follows:15 A is in health if, and only if, A has the ability,
given standard circumstances, to realize his vital goals,
i.e. the set of goals which are necessary and together
sufficient for his minimal happiness.16
It is important to recognize, for reasons which will
become clearer further below, that rather than talking
5 N. Daniels. 1985. Just health care. Cambridge & New York: Cam-
bridge University Press; J. Rawls. 1993. Political liberalism. New York:
Columbia University Press: 182–185.
6 C. Boorse. 1997. A Rebuttal on Health. In Biomedical ethics reviews
What is Disease? J.M. Humber & R.F. Almeder, eds. Clifton, N.J.:
Humana Press: 1–134.
7 Nordenfelt et al., op. cit. note 2.
8 T. Schramme. A Qualified Defence of a Naturalist Theory of Health.
Med Health Care Philos 2007; 10: 11–17.
9 Nordenfelt et al., op. cit. note 2, p. 67.
10 Nordenfelt 1995, op. cit., note 2, p. 41; L. Nordenfelt. On the notions
of disability and handicap. Int J Soc Welf 1993; 2: 17–24., p. 17.
11 T. O’Connor & C. Sandis. 2010. A companion to the philosophy of
action. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
12 Nordenfelt, et al., op. cit. note 2, p. 67.
13 Nordenfelt 1995, op. cit. note 2, p. 93.
14 Nordenfelt et al., op. cit. note 2, p. 68.
15 To account for the health of human beings that do not have recog-
nizable intentionality such as infants, he offers a modified theory.
‘Infant I is in health if, and only if, the internal constitution and devel-
opment of I is such that, given standard adult support, the necessary
and jointly sufficient conditions for I’s minimal happiness are realized.’
Presumably, such a definition would also apply to individuals without
full rationality or mental capacities. Nordenfelt 1995, op. cit. note 2.
16 Nordenfelt 1995, op. cit. note 2, p. 97.
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about abilities to act in particular ways that aim to
achieve a vital goal, for rhetorical ease he speaks directly
about the vital goals. He clearly does not mean to say
that health is reflected in levels of achievement of vital
goals. Health is the abilities to achieve vital goals.
Minimal happiness or flourishing is conceptualized as
the outcome-states or achieving goals, but the health of a
person is her abilities to achieve vital goals. Furthermore,
though health is having the ability to achieve vital goals,
to be unhealthy is not reflected by the not achieving of
the vital goals, but by lack of the second order ability
to acquire the first-order ability to achieve vital goals.
Non-health is the lack of capability to produce the ability
to achieve the goal. For example, either not being
adequately nourished or not having the first-order ability
to be nourished (e.g. feed oneself) is not enough to be
labelled as being unhealthy. I am not healthy when I
am not able to acquire or learn the ability to achieve
adequate nutrition. If I am currently not well nourished
but can become well nourished through learning or
acquiring the ability to be well nourished, I am still
healthy. The point at which I extinguish my own second
order ability to do the first-order action, or some other
biological event, another person, or an environmental
factor destroys it, I then become ill or unhealthy.17 It is
particularly insightful of Nordenfelt to account for such a
second order ability. It recognizes that individuals move
around different environments and/or require learning
time to adapt, or some individuals may choose to not
achieve their vital goals. Nordenfelt offers the example of
an African farmer moving to a Nordic country. She may
not immediately be able to achieve her vital goals in the
new environment but after a period of time, she develops
her abilities to achieve her vital goals. Looking at her
achievements or first-order abilities might lead to con-
cluding that she is unhealthy but it is her second-order
ability that plays the pivotal role in her producing abili-
ties and goal-achievements. The second order ability is
defined as:
A has a second-order ability with regard to an action
F, if and only if, A has the first-order ability to pursue
a training-program after the completion of which A
will have the first-order ability to do F.18
I would argue that Nordenfelt has brought us far in the
path towards a coherent account of health. His corpus
of writings as a whole show the inadequacy of Boorse’s
theory as well as express great care in systematically
articulating his own theory while addressing a wide range
of possible objections. Nordenfelt’s methodological
approach and architecture of the argument are very
useful in conceptualizing health. But there are three
weaknesses. I consider each in turn, and show how they
can be overcome by integrating it with the social and
political theory of human capabilities.
Empty set of vital goals
The first weakness is that Nordenfelt stops short of filling
in the framework of vital goals with any content. He
explains why certain goals are vital but he does not iden-
tify the content of vital goals; what exactly are the vital
goals that make a flourishing or minimally decent human
life? Recently, Nordenfelt argued that vital goals across
societies will have a similar ‘torso’. By that he means that
across societies there will be some common body of
content of the vital goals. He makes an analogy between
the possibility of shared health concepts across extant
societies with different notions of health over time within
societies stating, ‘Health has always had to do with a
person’s well-being and ability related to his or her inter-
nal somatic and mental conditions.’19 Even if that is true,
it is unclear why he stops short of articulating what is or
could be the common body of vital goals within these
general parameters. For example, even though he recog-
nizes sheer survival or biological viability as only one of
many vital goals of human beings, he does not specify this
as part of the ‘torso’. This is at least one common vital
goal across the entire human species, so should it not be
specified in the theory? In response to such an assessment
Nordenfelt could reply that he has in fact given con-
sideration to the substance of vital goals. In a discussion
in On the Nature of Health he writes, ‘Being alive is a
necessary condition of being happy . . . Hence all the
necessary conditions for maintenance of life must be
included among every person’s vital goals, for instance
having food, having a sheltered home and having some
economic security.’20 And so, from this discussion we
are supposedly capable of deducing at least a shortlist of
shared universal vital goals across the human species.
While this may be a possible path, Nordenfelt himself has
not in fact produced a short list of vital goals, and so his
set of vital goals still remains (seemingly) empty.
Standard circumstances
Nordenfelt is asserting, quite rightly, that health is not
just a phenomenon internal to the body, something found
17 In contrast to first and second-order abilities, I argue elsewhere that
a human capability can be conceptualized as being constructed by the
interaction of personal biological features, external social and physical
conditions, and personal behaviours or agency. Furthermore, health is
then reflected in the quality and breadth of a basic set of inter-dependent
capabilities. S. Venkatapuram. 2011. Health justice. An argument from
the capabilities approach. Cambridge: Polity Press.
18 Nordenfelt 1995, op. cit. note 2, p. 148.
19 L. Nordenfelt. Establishing a Middle-range Position in the Theory of
Health: A Reply to my Critics.Med Health Care Philos 2007; 10: 29–32,
p. 31.
20 Nordenfelt 1995, op. cit. note 2, p. 91.
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within the biological structure, but also reflects the direct
influence of the environment whether through physical or
social forces upon the individual. When a person has no
practical possibility to act because something or someone
constrains their (second-order) capacity of action, then
they are disabled and impaired, and not ‘in health’.
However, the clause ‘given standard circumstances’ in his
definition appears to be complete capitulation to the local
social circumstances in determining the content of vital
goals. This exposes Nordenfelt’s theory to the charge
of advocating social and ethical relativism. This is the
second weakness of Nordenfelt’s theory. While Norden-
felt may be reasoning about what a coherent understand-
ing of health is, by defining it, he is also advocating how
health should be envisaged. He may believe he is only
making a logical point by describing the role of external
conditions in a person’s ability to achieve vital goals.
For example, the standard circumstances usually have
to include oxygen for a human being to achieve her vital
goals. But because defining a concept has normative
aspects, his definition cannot be seen to be adequate for
its social, cultural, and ethical relativism.Which standard
circumstances? Whose standard circumstances? Norden-
felt does recognize this tension as he states that local
conditions can either be standard or reasonable. He sug-
gests that in different discourses about health, we will
either accept some notion of standard circumstances in
assessing a person’s abilities, and in others we will use
benchmarks of reasonable circumstances.21 But it seems
only to bolster further the point that the definition of
health is contextually dependent on what is considered
standard or reasonable for that scenario. And standard
and reasonable are concepts with pivotal influence that
come from outside his theory.
This possibility that health could be assessed against
culturally relative circumstances or against what are con-
sidered to be reasonable circumstances, is unsatisfying. A
theory of health is needed precisely to specify or evaluate
rights and obligations related to health where local
circumstances conflict with or fall well below what are
considered to be reasonable circumstances. Assessing a
person to be ‘healthy for their standard environment’
runs the risk of obscuring much ill health and injustice.
One of the clearest illustrations of where common social
practices and individual vital goals are not aligned is
evinced in the high levels of endemic and acute mortality
of girls and women in developing countries. Aside from
biological vulnerability, the social, political, and eco-
nomic practices that are locally determined undermine
the abilities of girls and women to achieve basic function-
ings around the world. In particular, poor reproductive
and sexual health in girls and women because of
‘standard’ patriarchal cultural norms leads to millions of
avoidable deaths and impairments every year.22 Beyond
the particular issue of women’s health, the role of social
arrangements in the causation and distribution of pre-
ventable mortality and disease is profound and pervasive
across all human societies. Because the standard environ-
ment, or cultural norms can conflict with the achievement
of vital goals of individuals, especially of those who are
socially powerless, local cultural practices or the status
quo should not have absolute determining power over the
content of vital goals; or in determining who can achieve
them, when, where, and how long. It is also important
to recognize the influence, whether good or bad, of the
social circumstances on how individuals identify and
pursue their own vital goals. The choices we make depend
on the choices we consciously or unconsciously think we
have. The standard circumstance clause could potentially
undermine the centrality of vital goals to health if the
standard circumstances determine them. We want a
conception of human health to be informed by but not
wholly determined by local conditions and practices.
Nordenfelt takes us far by defining health as the abili-
ties to achieve vital goals that lead to minimal happiness
or minimally decent life. But he then suggests that these
vital goals can be determined either locally or according
to an external notion of ‘standard’ or ‘reasonable’ cir-
cumstances. In order for it to be a theory of health that
covers the entire human species, the empty or socially
relative definition of vital goals must be replaced with
at least a core, stable, species-wide definition of vital
goals. In searching for such a species-wide conception of
minimal human welfare or wellbeing, there are a range
of options. I could endeavour to identify a conception of
vital goals based on my own personal conception of rea-
sonable circumstances. However, it seems more prudent
to draw on the large body of literature and state-of-the-
art philosophical debates on human wellbeing or quality
of life. In doing so, the overlap between Nordenfelt’s vital
goals and the idea of basic or central human capabilities,
advocated by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, is
striking. Nordenfelt’s argument quite literally bridges
the debates on the philosophy of health, medicine, and
biology with the theory of human capabilities through the
idea of health as the abilities to achieve vital goals. Nor-
denfelt’s abilities to achieve vital goals are analogous if
not the same as capabilities. The overlap should not be
very surprising as upon closer examination it becomes
clear that both Nordenfelt and the capabilities approach
are informed by Aristotle’s reasoning on action, influence
21 Nordenfelt et al., op. cit. note 2, p. 68.
22 C.J.L. Murray & A. Lopez. 1996. The global burden of disease : a
comprehensive assessment of mortality and disability from diseases, inju-
ries, and risk factors in 1990 and projected to 2020. Boston, MA:
Harvard School of Public Health on behalf of the World Health
Organization and the World Bank.
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of the environment, and human flourishing.23 Nordenfelt
and Nussbaum also follow similar paths in identifying a
conception of minimum human wellbeing or ‘happiness
in the long run’.
INTEGRATING VITAL GOALS AND
CENTRAL CAPABILITIES
Nordenfelt is aware of the capabilities approach and has
commented on relevant similarities and differences with
Sen’s arguments.24 He recognizes that his conception of
health and wellbeing gives greater weight to subjective
mental welfare, and that it is concerned with a smaller
set of capabilities than Sen’s general concern with
human capabilities. Nordenfelt does not, however, con-
sider Nussbaum’s arguments for a set of basic capabili-
ties. This would address his observation that capabilities
theory is broader than his concerns about vital goals. The
theory being advanced here is the integration of Norden-
felt’s conception of health as the abilities to achieve vital
goals with a list of core capabilities or freedoms. Thereby,
health is having capabilities to achieve a certain cluster of
capabilities and functionings. In this view health can also
be seen as involving a second-order or over-arching meta-
capability to achieve a cluster of basic capabilities and
functionings. The justification for these capabilities being
human species-wide, across all societies, comes from free-
standing ethical reasoning about the importance of basic
human freedoms and equal human dignity. Health is
envisaged as fundamentally an ethical concept arising out
of the values of human liberty and equal dignity.
Like Nordenfelt, Nussbaum also finds the basic needs
and desire satisfaction approaches lacking in conceptual-
izing human well being.25 Though Nordenfelt was think-
ing about a person’s health in relation to human
flourishing and achieving vital goals, Nussbaum’s main
project is to define the components of a human life that
reflect equal human dignity. Based on both Aristotle and
Marx, she conceives human dignity as being able to be
and do certain things; having certain capabilities.
Through a method of dialectical reasoning very similar to
Nordenfelt’s, but asking what kind of life is worthy of
human dignity – a minimally decent human life – across
all societies, Nussbaum identifies such a life to consist of
at least a threshold level of ten capabilities.26 And just like
Nordenfelt, but for the different reason of valuing choice,
Nussbaum also highlights the abilities and not the actual
achievements. In contrast to Nordenfelt’s reliance on
ordinary language and action-theory philosophy, Nuss-
baum starts in the historical debates about natural law
and sees certain ethical entitlements or claims implicit
in the idea of human dignity.27 She then identifies a life
worthy of human dignity to consist of ten capabilities
including:
1) being able to live a normal length of lifespan; 2)
having good health; 3) maintain bodily integrity; 4) being
able to use senses, imagination, and think; 5) having
emotions and emotional attachments; 6) possess practical
reason to form a conception of the good; 7) have social
affiliations that are meaningful and respectful; 8) express
concern for other species; 9) able to play; and 10) have
control over one’s material and political environment.28
These ten capabilities, as moral entitlements emanating
from a person’s human dignity, become the source of
political principles for liberal pluralistic society; ensuring
each member achieves a threshold level of these ten
central capabilities become primary political goals.29 So,
unlike Nordenfelt who capitulates to the standard envi-
ronment of various human societies or relies on the idea
of reasonable circumstances external to his theory, Nuss-
baum defines what the standard environment should be
in light of the moral, pre-political entitlements of human
beings to the capabilities to achieve some ‘beings and
doings’. But her conception also has room for individuals
and different societies or countries to determine vital
goals. Societies can add to the list of basic capabilities but
cannot take capabilities away from the list, meaning that
societies cannot choose to abdicate from supporting some
capabilities. However, while the set of capabilities will be
constant, different societies will determine the threshold
levels of each capability depending on their history and
resources. But these thresholds cannot be set only by
domestic, ‘bounded’ reasoning or wholly determined by
locally available circumstances. The levels must be deter-
mined through reasoning that involves a range of experts
and stakeholders within and across societies.
In case there is any confusion, Nussbaum clearly con-
siders her list of capabilities as constituting a conception
of a life of minimal human dignity and not as providing a
conception of health. But capabilities related to longevity
and health are always listed first and second on her list
of ten equally important capabilities. And even more
intriguing is a footnote in Women and Human Deve-
lopment. In the footnote, Nussbaum writes that the
23 M.C. Nussbaum. 1987. Nature, Function, and Capability: Aristotle
on political distribution. In World Institute for Development Economics
Research Working Papers. Helsinki; L. Nordenfelt & B.I.B. Lindahl.
1984. Health, disease, and causal explanations in medicine. Dordrecht:
Kluwer Academic Publishers; Nordenfelt 1995, op. cit. note 2.
24 Nordenfelt 200, op. cit. note 2, pp. 94–105; personal communication
25 M.C. Nussbaum. 2000.Women and human development: the capabili-
ties approach. Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press;
M.C. Nussbaum & A.K. Sen. 1993. The Quality of life. New York:
Clarendon Press.
26 Nussbaum, op. cit. note 25; Nussbaum, op. cit. note 3.
27 Nussbaum, op. cit. note 3, p. 37.
28 Ibid: 76–77; Nussbaum 2000, op. cit. note 25, pp. 78–80.
29 Nussbaum, op. cit. note 3, p. 70.
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definition of reproductive health adopted in the Section 7
of the Final Programme of Action of the 1994 Cairo
Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) ‘fits
well with the intuitive idea of truly human functioning
that guides this list’.30 That is, Nussbaum appears to be
saying that the definition of reproductive health as ‘a
state of complete physical, mental and social well- being
and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity, in all
matters relating to the reproductive system and to its
functions and processes’ fits with what she is trying to
accomplish through specifying ten central human capa-
bilities. This definition of reproductive health in turn
mimics the World Health Organization’s definition of
health, which it should be noted, has frequently been
disparaged as being nonsensical, utopian, and unfeasible.
In any case, the implication of Nussbaum drawing a par-
allel between the ICPD/WHO’s definition of health and
the list of CHCs is that it is in fact possible to define
health capability as being made up of all ten capabilities.
And, the footnote shows that Nussbaum is aware of at
least one account of health that could possibly encompass
all ten CHCs. Moreover, Nussbaum’s awareness that
health could be conceived as being more than just the
absence of disease seems to support the notion that the
health capability on her list is really about the capability
to avoid disease and impairments. Otherwise, she would
be putting a list of capabilities within a health capability,
and thereby, creating a list within a list. But why then
does Nussbaum still use the label of health capability
instead of referring to the capability to avoid disease and
impairments? It may simply be the case that even here,
the notion of health as the absence of disease has not been
given sufficient scrutiny.
Indeed, if Nussbaum’s list of capabilities proves to be
troublesome as constituting health, we could develop a
different set of basic capabilities. One could use alterna-
tive methodologies to come up with a different set of vital
goals or capabilities, and it would still accomplish our
goals of creating content for Nordenfelt’s vital goals.
For example, Gillian Brock argues that it is plausible to
achieve global consensus on basic needs that are neces-
sary for human agency; for ‘what a human being is like’.31
And Ingrid Robeyns has yet another method for iden-
tifying basic human capabilities.32 What is important
is that the idea of health as the capability to achieve a
cluster of basic capabilities and functionings still holds.
Criticising one capability or functioning, such as the
health capability on Nussbaum’s list, does not undermine
the argument that health should be seen as being able to
achieve a cluster of basic capabilities or vital goals. To
undermine that argument would entail going back and
objecting to Nordenfelt’s reasoning about health as being
able to realize goals necessary and sufficient for minimal
happiness; that is, a minimally flourishing, decent, non-
humiliating life in the modern world.
Vital goals too broad
Thomas Schramme offers one such objection to Norden-
felt’s theory. This is the third weakness. He argues that
the definition of vital goals is too broad particularly, as it
relates to subjective preferences.33 Schramme illustrates
his objection using the example of an ambitious athlete.
Lily, a high jumper, has struggled for a long time to
become an accomplished athlete, but has not succeeded
and is not happy. Because Lily has not achieved her
minimal happiness according to Nordenfelt’s theory, she
is not healthy. This seems odd to Schramme, especially as
Lily has no disease. Moreover, Schramme also points out
that by changing her goals, by becoming less ambitious,
Lily could become healthy. Schramme’s critique is that
the inability of Lily to achieve minimal happiness because
her ambitions outstripped her physical talents should not
render her unhealthy. Nordenfelt replies that he views
health as being on a spectrum from optimally healthy to
maximal illness, presumably death. Therefore, Lily’s
unhappiness from not achieving her athletic goals moves
her down on this scale away from optimum health. But
she is unlikely to be ill/unhealthy unless her disappoint-
ment becomes debilitating. But for such a scale to work,
Nordenfelt also needs to use thresholds to distinguish
optimum from moderate health, and moderate health
from poor or ill health. It is unclear where or how those
thresholds will be created.
Some may find that Nordenfelt is letting a person’s
subjective preferences, or ideas of happiness, determine
health too much. Consider the opposite scenario where
a person who has a cheery disposition despite being
impaired would be considered healthy, or moderately
healthy. Or, a person with low ambition or low happi-
ness thresholds would be considered healthy. While
Nordenfelt understandably links vital goals to the emo-
tional happiness of the individual, a strong role of
subjective experiences of happiness determining health
would make the conception incoherent. And it is not
sufficient to say that ‘happiness in the long term’ will
more closely resemble Aristotelian flourishing. There
needs to be a greater specification of the extent to which
emotional happiness or preference satisfaction will con-
stitute the wider set of ‘long-run happiness’. However, if
we use Nussbaum’s list of capabilities as the content of
30 Nussbaum 2000, op. cit. note 25, footnote p. 83.
31 G. Brock. 2005. Needs and Global Justice. In The philosophy of need.
S. Reader, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 51–72.
32 I. Robeyns. Sen’s Capability Approach and Gender iInequality:
Selecting Relevant Capabilities. Feminist Economics 2003; 9: 61–92; I.
Robeyns. Selecting Capabilities for Quality of Life Measurement.
Social Indicators Research 2005; 74: 191–215. 33 Schramme, op. cit. note 8.
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Nordenfelt’s vital goals, including the idea of sufficient
thresholds, then Lily would be considered healthy.
Rather than being considered unhealthy because she
is emotionally unhappy due to not becoming a stellar
athlete, if she is above the thresholds of basic capabili-
ties, she would simply be an unhappy, disappointed
person. She still has sufficient abilities to achieve her ten
vital goals; health does not have to include the abilities
to achieve any or all goals that will produce satisfaction
or mental wellbeing. Nussbaum’s list, by its breadth and
sufficiency levels, allows for some level of subjective
experiences but constrains the scope of vital goals from
becoming total wellbeing. Thereby, it also constrains
what is included in the conception of health. Health as a
core set of capabilities represents a minimal conception
of human wellbeing.
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
The theory presented here clearly moves the concept of
health away from a central focus on disease or what is
typical or most frequent functioning of internal biological
parts and processes. It advances health as a person’s
capability to achieve or exercise some basic capabilities
and functionings in the contemporary world. This obvi-
ously implies a cascade of consequences in a variety of
health related domains. Foremost, reconfiguring our
concept of health will affect epidemiology, the framework
and methodology we currently use to study the causation
and distribution of disease and mortality. Very few epi-
demiologists actually study the causation of health.34 Epi-
demiology and other health sciences would still continue
to study the causes of diseases and impairments but they
would also need to expand to study the causation and
distribution of the cluster of basic capabilities and func-
tionings. Conceptualizing and measuring capabilities is
already being done in social exclusion studies, develop-
ment economics, and in health economics.35 The natural
sciences could provide knowledge about the biological
bases of human capabilities. While the social sciences
could provide knowledge about the social determinants
of capabilities and their constraints. Furthermore, health
policy will not just be confined to preventing and manag-
ing diseases but be more broadly concerned with protect-
ing, promoting, sustaining, and restoring sufficient levels
of capabilities to achieve functionings. It is not that sur-
geons will be expected to do more than surgery. But
rather, what is considered to be health policy or health
expertise will have to include more than healthcare.
Health policy and expertise will have to encompass all the
determinants of the different core human capabilities that
constitute a minimally decent life.
This reconfigured conception of health will also pro-
foundly affect how we respond to different distributions
in health, the causes of the constraints on basic capabili-
ties, their persistence, and the differential experiences
or consequences of such constraints. And importantly,
this ethical concept of health as the ability to achieve
capabilities is a human species-wide conception; it puts
the health of every human being across all societies on the
same plane of observation and analysis. Health is defined
in terms that reflect the equal dignity of human beings in
the contemporary world.
If all this talk about health as achieving vital goals or
cluster of capabilities and functionings seems too theo-
retical or fanciful, it should be noted that Nordenfelt’s
argument and my reconfiguration of it are really not
radical or revolutionary. The criticism of Boorse’s theory
and the exhortation that we should be redirecting health-
care and health systems towards producing health rather
than narrowly on preventing and managing disease has
been a long-standing cause in the health sciences.36
Decades ago, Aaron Antonovsky even put forward a
formal ‘salutogenic’ theoretical model of health to guide
healthcare and health policy.37 And more recently, the
World Health Assembly renamed the second edition
of the International Classification of Impairments,
Disabilities and Handicaps as the International Classi-
fication of Functioning, Disability and Health.38 This
renaming reflects intellectual and social movements that
seek to recognize health as being a spectrum from fully
functioning in the world to being fully impaired, and
34 F.A. Huppert & N. Baylis. Well-being: Towards an Integration of
Psychology, Neurobiology and Social Science. Philos Trans R Soc Lond
B Biol Sci 2004; 359: 1447–1451; F.A. Huppert, et al. Introduction:
Why Do We Need a Science of Well-being? Philos Trans R Soc Lond B
Biol Sci 2004; 359: 1331–1332.
35 P. Anand et al. Capabilities and Well-being: Evidence Based on the
Sen-Nussbaum Approach to Welfare. Social Indicators Research 2005;
74: 9–55; Ibid; J. Coast, et al. Valuing the ICECAP Capability Index for
Older People. Soc Sci Med 2008; 67: 874–882; P.W. Saleeby. Applica-
tions of a Capability Approach to Disability and the International
Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF) in Social
Work Practice. J Soc Work Disabil Rehabil 2007; 6: 217–232, P. Anand.
QALYs and Capabilities: a Comment on Cookson. Health Economics
2005; 14: 1283–1286; T. Burchardt. Capabilities and Disability: the
Capabilities Framework and the Social Model of Disability. Disabil
Soc 2004; 19: 735–751; E. Chiappero-Martinetti & J.M. Roche. 2009.
Operationalization of the Capability Approach, from Theory to
Practice: A Review of Techniques and Empirical Applications. In
Debating Global Society Reach and Limits of the Capability Approach.
E. Chiappero-Martinetti, ed. Milano: Fondazione Giangiacomo
Feltrinelli: Grafica Sipiel.
36 I. Illich. Medical Nemesis. Lancet 1974; 1: 918–921.
37 A. Antonovsky. 1979. Health, stress and coping. San Francisco &
London: Jossey-Bass.
38 World Health Organization. 2001. International Classification
of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF). Geneva: World Health
Organization.
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explicitly recognizes that functionings or capabilities are
co-produced by the features of the individual and sur-
rounding environment.39
There has also been much work in health and medical
sociology which examines how the concept of health and
related social phenomenon are profoundly changing;
they are becoming ‘diffused’ beyond a scientific or disease
focus, beyond the individual body, and outside of the
medical care system.40 All of this is to say that the concept
of health is profoundly changing; it is not exclusively
focused on the absence of disease, and is moving towards
a holistic view.
Bringing together Nordenfelt’s analysis with that
of the capabilities approach has benefits for both. For
Nordenfelt, his definition can become more defensible by
incorporating the idea of basic human capabilities and
justifiable through freestanding ethical reasoning. For the
capabilities approach, Nordenfelt provides a link to the
philosophy of health debates and offers a way of avoiding
the pitfalls of using the notion of health as the absence of
disease. Nussbaum faces exactly this problem with how
she defines the health capability on her list. Also, the
problems of ranking basic capabilities and the incoherent
separation between the capability to live a long lifespan
from the capability to be healthy get solved. Through
health as a meta-capability, all the ten capabilities are
recognized as being part of a cluster and inter-dependent.
Furthermore, some have argued that a non-scientific or
ethical definition of health usually collapses into a con-
ception of total wellbeing.41 Nordenfelt presents an argu-
ment for how health can be defined as a minimal account
of wellbeing, or achieving vital goals. This argument
combined with Nussbaum’s reasoning about minimal
conception of wellbeing helps to define health as minimal
conception of human wellbeing. Nordenfelt provides the
structure of health as the ability to achieve vital goals for
minimal happiness that includes both subjective and
objective content of vital goals, while Nussbaum provides
the content of the vital goals in the form of ten central
human capabilities. The breadth and extent of these basic
capabilities reflect a conception of human dignity that
encompasses the neediness, sociability and ability to
reason in pursuing a life plan in the modern world.
CONCLUSION
The main points to take away from this article is that
health as a concept can be defensibly conceived as a
meta-capability, the capability to achieve a cluster of
basic capabilities to be and do things that reflect a life
worthy of equal human dignity. Nordenfelt provides a
line of reasoning to conceptualizing health as the ability
to achieve a set of vital goals which, I have argued, is the
same as saying having the capability to achieve a set of
basic capabilities and functionings. While Nordenfelt
arrives at his vital goals or minimally decent life through
linguistic and action-theory philosophy, Nussbaum
grounds her ‘central human capabilities’ in human
dignity, equal respect, and other ethical values. And as I
stated earlier, Nordenfelt and I are not the only ones
seeking to define health in terms of abilities to function in
the world. There are many other ways to get to health as
a basic set of individual capabilities, thus bolstering an
argument for seeing health as a meta-capability or ability
to achieve a cluster of capabilities.
Finally, Nordenfelt’s notion of health as the abilities to
achieve vital goals really helps bring to the forefront the
primacy of health in the lives of individuals and societies.
If abilities to achieving vital goals are indeed the most
important things in people’s lives, then they (i.e. health)
should be the most important social goals. Nordenfelt’s
reasoning when combined with Nussbaum’s argument
that the ten basic capabilities of citizens form the core of
basic political principles, catapults health of citizens to
the forefront of the social agenda. Philosophers and gov-
ernment officials often point out that health is only one
among many pressing social goals, and individuals value
health as only one among many other things in their life.
Health-economists point to trade-offs that individuals
are willing to make between health and other goods such
as income. When health is properly understood as achiev-
ing vital goals, and the moral entitlements to the capa-
bilities to achieve these vital goals are duly recognized as
basic political principles grounded in freedom and equal
dignity, the health of citizens becomes the first priority of
social justice, and one of the most basic values of society.
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